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WILLS-VALIDITY

OF

SIGNATURE

FOR

ATTESTED

WILLS.

Scritchfield v. Loyd, 267 Ark. 24, 589 S.W.2d 557 (1979).
Johnnie D. Loyd went to a Notary Public to have a do-ityouself form will completed and executed. The Notary Public informed him that she did not know how to execute a will and declined to provide this service. Loyd asked the Notary Public to fill
in the various blanks in the form will according to his instructions.
She agreed and filled in the blanks, including the dispositive provisions, in her handwriting. The line on the form which provides for
the testator's signature was signed by the Notary Public, and she
placed her commission expiration date to the left of her signature.
Loyd signed the form will below its heading and in the blank in the
attestation clause at the bottom of the will. Two individuals at the
Notary Public's business signed the will as witnesses. The instrument left the testator's entire estate to a nephew and also appointed
him as executor.
After the testator's death, the instrument was admitted to probate, and a brother and two sisters of the decedent filed a timely
contest of the will. The contestants argued that the testator's signature, which appeared in the attestation clause of the will, did not
comply with the statutory provisions for the execution of attested
wills which require that the testator's signature be at the end of the
instrument.1
The probate court held that the instrument was in form legally
sufficient to constitute a will under Arkansas law. On appeal, the
Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the will, stating that there was sufficient compliance with the statute requiring the signature to be at
the end. Scritchfield v. Loyd, 267 Ark. 24, 589 S.W.2d 557 (1979).
In England, the location of the testator's signature in a will was
not initially considered important. 2 The English Statute of Frauds
of 1677 only required that the testator sign a will devising land.3
The English Wills Act of 1837 amended the Statute of Frauds and
required that the will be signed "at the foot or end thereof."'4 In
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-403(a)(5) (1971) provides: "In any of the above cases the
signature must be at the end of the instrument and the act must be done in presence of two
[2] or more attesting witnesses."
2.. 2 PAGE ON WILLS § 19.54 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960).
3. 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677).
4. 7 Will. IV & 1 Vict., c. 26 (1837).
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1852, the English Wills Act was amended to provide that the testator's signature might be placed "at or after, or following, or under,
or beside, or opposite to the End of the Will," so long as it appeared
from the face of the will that the testator
intended by his signature to
5
give effect to the writing as his will.

A majority of the state wills acts do not specify a particular
place for the testator to sign his will. 6 This view has also been

adopted by the Uniform Probate Code.7 A minority of states have
adopted the requirement set forth in the English Wills Act of 1837
that the will be signed at the end.'
The states which have statutes requiring wills to be signed by
the testator at the end are confronted with cases litigating the many
fact situations concerning the location of the testator's signature.9
For example, there is a conflict in authority regarding the validity of
an attested will when the deceased's signature is located at the logical end, but not the physical end of the document.' This situation
could easily arise when the will contains several pages which are not
in the proper order. A majority of the states hold that when the
internal continuity of the instrument concludes logically with the
signature of the decedent, the will is valid."
There is also a conflict in authority regarding whether the deceased's signature in the attestation clause of the instrument constitutes a substantial compliance with the statutory requirement that
an attested will be signed at the end.' 2 Those courts which strictly
construe the statute and hold that a signature in the attestation
clause is not a signature at the end do not place emphasis on the fact
that the testator intended that his signature be effective as executing
his last will and testament.'

3

In Sears v. Sears, 14 for example, the

5. 15 & 16 Vict., c. 24 (1852).
6. Rees, American Wills Statutes. 1, 46 VA. L. REV. 613, 619 (1960).
7. U.P.C. § 2-502.
8. Rees, American Wills Statutes.- I, 46 VA. L. REV. 613, 619 (1960).

9. Some of the fact situations in which there seems to be a conffict in authority regarding whether the placement of the testator's signature satisfies similar statutory provisions
include: marginal notations above the signature of the testator, wills containing blank
spaces, wills containing testamentary writing on both sides, wills written on several sheets of
paper and signed at the logical end, wills written on several sheets of paper and signed at the
physical end, the signature of the testator on the back of the will, the signature following the
attestation clause or witness's signature, and the signature preceding the codicil. Annot., 44
A.L.R.3d 701 (1972).

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id at 717.
Id
Id at 730.
See, e.g., Sears v. Sears, 77 Ohio St. 104, 82 N.E. 1067 (1907); Schubert v.
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Ohio court held that even if the testatrix wrote her name in the attestation clause, such fact would be immaterial because her signature
also indicated that
was not at the end of the will. The Ohio court
5
the intent of the testatrix was not important.'
The courts which hold that a signature in the attestation clause
sufficiently complies with the statutory requirement that the signature be at the end place the major emphasis on the testator's intent. 16
In In re Schiele's Estate,'7 for example, the Florida court held a signature by the testator in the attestation clause with the intention that
the instrument should constitute the will of the testator was in substantial compliance with the statute requiring the signature to be at
the end.
An analysis of the cases in Arkansas seems to indicate that the
Arkansas Supreme Court places the major emphasis on the testator's intent.'" Prior to the enactment of Act 140 of 1949,' 9 the Arkansas statute required that all wills be signed by the testator at the
end of the will.2" The purpose of this requirement was to protect
against fraud.2 ' There are no Arkansas cases construing this old
statute with respect to whether the testator's signature in an attested
will was at the end. An analysis of the cases concerning holographic
wills, however, indicates that the statute was not strictly construed
Christman, 16 Ohio App. 432 (1922); Herbster v. Pincombe, 10 Ohio App. 322 (1918); In re
Estate of Knupp, 428 Pa. 409, 235 A.2d 585 (1967); In re Estate of Glace, 413 Pa. 91, 196
A.2d 297 (1964); In re Friese's Estate, 336 Pa. 24, 9 A.2d 401 (1939); In re Bridge's Estate,
139 Pa. Super. Ct. 606, 13 A.2d 125 (1940); Glover Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. 310 (1951).
14. 77 Ohio St. 104, 82 N.E. 1067 (1907).

15. Id at 108, 82 N.E. at 1072.
16. See, e.g., In re Tonneson's Estate, 81 Cal. App. 2d 703, 185 P.2d 78 (1947); In re
Morey's Estate, 75 Cal. App. 2d 628, 171 P.2d 131 (1946); In re Schiele's Estate, 51 So. 2d
287 (Fla. 1951); In re Rivers' Will, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 589 (1945); In re Eyett's Will, 124 Misc. 523,
209 N.Y.S. 251 (1925); In re Noon's Will, 31 Misc. 420, 65 N.Y.S. 568 (1900); In re Estate of
Treitinger, 440 Pa. 616, 269 A.2d 497 (1970); In re Estate of Miller, 414 Pa. 385, 200 A.2d

284 (1964).
17. 51 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1951).
18. Scritchfield v. Loyd, 267 Ark. 24, 589 S.W.2d 557 (1979); Walpole v. Lewis, 254
Ark. 89, 492 S.W.2d 410 (1973); Weems v. Smith, 218 Ark. 554, 237 S.W.2d 880 (1951);
Musgrove v. Holt, 153 Ark. 355, 240 S.W. 1068 (1922); Borchers v. Borchers, 145 Ark. 426,
224 S.W. 729 (1920).
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-403 to -404 (1971).
20. 2 POPE'S DIGEST § 14512 (1937) provides in pertinent part: "Every last will and
testament of real or personal property, or both. . . must be subscribed by the testator at the
end of the will, or by some person for him, at his request."
21. Owens v. Douglas, 121 Ark. 448, 181 S.W. 896 (1915). The court indicated that
"[tihe purpose of our statute in requiring wills to be signed at the end thereof is to provide
against fraud, and this statutory requirement must not be frittered away by loose interpretation." Id at 452, 181 S.W. at 898.
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when there was an absence of fraud and the requisite testamentary
intent was present.22
In Borchers v. Borchers23 the alleged will consisted of a statement following the deceased's signature in a letter to his father.
The court indicated that the dispositive provision followed the deceased's signature and was therefore not in compliance with the Arkansas statute requiring that all wills be signed by the testator at the
end.24 The court placed emphasis on the fact that the deceased had
written his mother several letters which indicated a contrary intent.25
Even though the court in Borchers strictly construed the statute,
several cases which followed indicated that the court would place
more emphasis on the testator's intent and the absence of fraud. In
Musgrove v. Holt26 non-dispositive words followed the testator's signature in a holographic will. The court upheld the will, indicating
that there was no indication of fraud, and that the non-dispositive

provisions following the signature did not affect the wiU.27 The

court in Weems v. Smith 28 went a step further and held that a holographic will in which the last three words of the sole dispositive
clause were below the testator's signature 29 was in substantial corn22. Weems v. Smith, 218 Ark. 554, 237 S.W.2d 880 (1951); Musgrove v. Holt, 153 Ark.
355, 240 S.W. 1068 (1922); Borchers v. Borchers, 145 Ark. 426, 224 S.W. 729 (1920).
23. 145 Ark. 426, 224 S.W. 729 (1920). The statement following the decedent's signa-

ture provided: "'Papa, if I die for my country, I want you to receive my insurance money.
Goodbye.'" Id at 427, 224 S.W. at 729.
24. Id at 428, 224 S.W. at 729.
25. Id at 427, 224 S.W. at 729. Letters written by the decedent both before and after

the letter in question indicate that the decedent had purchased an insurance policy and
designated his mother as beneficiary.
26. 153 Ark. 355, 240 S.W. 1068 (1922). The last clause of the will originally provided:
"'I appoint J.I. Porter and Earl Holt my executors of this, my last will and testament, without bond. Consideration $1,000 dollars. (Signed) P.D. Porter.' Pencil marks were run
through the words 'Consideration $1,000 dollars' and after the signature was written...
'They to receive $1,000 in full for their services.'" Id at 358, 240 S.W. at 1068.
27. Id at 364, 240 S.W. at 1070.
28. 218 Ark. 554, 237 S.W.2d 880 (1951).
29. The following is a literal transcription of the holographic will which was in issue:
Sallie god Bless you
Ben so sweet and good to me
god Bless all the Ladies that

been so sweet & good to me
and you Mr. & Mrs. Conden

Sallie you know my troubles Better
than eny one else 35 year
Since 1914 tell Mr. Meeks to

help on Burial
no Doctor and not able
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pliance with the statutory requirement that all wills be signed at the
end. There was no indication of fraud, and the testamentary intent
was clear. The majority stated that the writing at the bottom of the
testator's signature was not a dispositive provision. Justice George
Rose Smith in dissent, however, observed that the last three words
of the sole dispositive provision were clearly below the testator's signature. 30 After the Weems case, it appeared that the Arkansas
court, at least with respect to holographic wills, would not strictly
construe the statute which required all wills to be signed at the end
when there was no indication of fraud and when testamentary intent
was present.
By Act 140 of 1949, 3 1 holographic wills were no longer required
to be signed at the end. 32 After the passage of this Act, it was uncertain whether the Arkansas court would construe attested wills as liberally as it had construed holographic wills, and to what extent the
Weems case would be controlling.3 3 Moreover, the legislative intent

in completely removing holographic wills from the requirements applied to attested wills was also unclear. 34 The general spirit and purTo go to one Salle this
is to much on you
Sallie god Bless you
for being so Sweet & good To
me this house blong to you
Sidney Smith
and every
every thing in it
Dear Sallie you was so sweet
and good to Me
Id at 555, 237 S.W.2d at 881.
30. Id at 560, 237 S.W.2d at 883.
31. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-404 (1971).
32. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-403 (1971) provides in pertinent part: "The execution of a
will, other than holographic, must be by the signature of the testator and of at least two [2]
witnesses. . .. [T]he signature must be at the end of the instrument and the act must be
done in the presence of two [2] or more attesting witnesses."
33. Weems v. Smith, 218 Ark. 554, 237 S.W.2d 880 (1951). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-404
(1971), which no longer required a holographic will to be signed at the end, was not applicable because Smith died a few months prior to the effective date of the statute. A student note
written not long after the adoption of Act 140 of 1949 argued that the Arkansas Supreme
Court should apply the Weems reasoning to attested wills as well. 7 ARK. L. REv. 159, 160
(1953).
34. In Smith v. McDonald the court stated:
[T]here is considerable room for speculation as to the legislative intent in completely removing holographic wills from the requirements as applied to other wills
and leaving other wills (other than holographic) to be executed "by the signature of
the testator . . . at the end of the instrument."
.. . Such relaxation as to holographic wills does not appear illogical when we
consider that the purpose of a will is to make disposition of property to take effect
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pose of Act 140 of 1949, Arkansas's first Probate Code, was that
"estates of decedents, minors and incompetents be quickly, efficiently and expeditiously handled to the best interests of all concerned, safeguarding every party at interest. ' 35 The extensive power
given the probate judge seemed to indicate that the general purpose
of the Code was to promote greater flexibility.36 In light of the general purpose of Act 140 of 1949, 37 it seemed logical that the Arkansas court would not alter its liberal construction of the statutory
requirement that the testator's signature appear at the end of the
will, even though this requirement was amended to apply to attested
wills only.
Wapole v. Lewis 38 seemed to add support to this conclusion,
although the placement of the testatrix's signature in the will was
not an issue that the court addressed. In Wa/pole a holographic will
was admitted to probate as an attested will. One sentence appeared
below the signature of the testatrix which designated the testatrix's
personal representative. The court indicated that in construing the
statute which required the testatrix to request that the witnesses sign
as attesting witnesses, it would follow its historical practice of avoiding a strict technical construction of statutory requirements when
there is no indication of fraud, deception, imposition, or undue influence.3 9

Any doubt that the court would liberally construe the statutory
requirement that an attested will be signed at the end was removed
in Scritchfield v. Loyd 40 The court recognized that there is a distinct
conflict among the authorities regarding whether a signature in the
attestation clause qualifies as a signature at the end.4 ' The court
reasoned: "[W]e believe the better rule to be that where the testator
places his signature in the attestation clause because he believes that
it belongs there and with the requisite testamentary intent, it constitutes a sufficient compliance with the statute requiring the signature
upon death, and the purpose of the statute relative to signature, is to protect against
fraud.
252 Ark. 931, 936, 481 S.W.2d 741, 744 (1972).

35. Meriwether, Act 140, The ProbateCode, 3 ARK. L. REV. 375, 376 (1949).
36. Id
37. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401 to -417 (1971).
38. 254 Ark. 89, 492 S.W.2d 410 (1973). The court did not discuss the fact that a sen-

tence appeared below the testator's signature.
39. Id at 94, 492 S.W.2d at 414.
40. 267 Ark. 24, 589 S.W.2d 557 (1979).
41. Id at 25, 589 S.W.2d at 559.
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to be 'at the end.' "42
Scritchfield aligns Arkansas with states which hold that a signature by the testator with the requisite testamentary intent in the attestation clause of an attested will constitutes substantial compliance
with the statutory requirement that an attested will be signed at the
end. Although the decision is largely fact-oriented, it provides some
insight into how the court might view several other factual situations
which have not been tested in Arkansas.
The result in Scritchfield seems to support the proposition that
the Weems case would be controlling in litigation involving an attested will. Therefore, absent evidence of fraud, and if the requisite
testamentary intent is present, the court should hold that dispositive
matter following the testator's signature in an attested will which
logically follows the body of the will would not invalidate the instrument.
In addition, Scritchfield seems to indicate that the court would
find that a signature at the logical end of a will, as opposed to the
physical end of the writing, would also sufficiently comply with the
statute which requires that the signature of the testator be at the end.
The possible fact situations which could arise are as numerous
as the possible locations where a signature could be placed other
than at the physical end of the will.43 Where the court will draw the
line is always hard to predict. Conceivably, the court could apply
the Scritchfield reasoning to any signature placement in an attested
will when there is no indication of fraud, and when the requisite
testamentary intent is present.
William Taylor Marshall

42. Id
43. See note 9 supra.

